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1. Introduction
Imagine perfect fissioning of a person A into two successors who are equally good 
candidates for being the person who underwent the fissioning, LA (on the left) and RA (on 
the right), on the basis of all the material and psychological relations (empirical relations 
for short) that each bears to A.  Imagine that if LA had been produced by the process 
without RA, we would judge that A = LA, and vice versa.  We seem, prima facie, to 
understand what it would be for A to survive as (be identical with) LA (and not RA), and 
what it would be for A to survive as (be identical with) RA (and not LA).  Does this show 
that 
[SBD]  A is not identical with, or constituted by, or composed (even in part) by a body, or 
any material stuff, or even any immaterial stuff. 
Call [SBD] the thesis of subject-body dualism. 
In (Nida-Rümelin 2006) and (Nida-Rümelin 2010), Martine Nida-Rümelin (NR) argued 
that these considerations do establish [SBD].   The master argument has three premises: 
1 My thanks to helpful conversation with Martine Nida-Rümelin and comments from two referees for this 
journal. 
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1. There is a factual difference between the claim that someone is one or the other of 
the two continuers in fission cases or we are subject to a pervasive illusion in our 
thoughts about personal identity over time (call this the illusion theory). 
2. There could be a factual difference between the claims that someone is one or the 
other of the two continuers in fission cases only if subject-body dualism were true. 
3. The illusion theory is untenable (false). 
4. Subject-body dualism is true [1-3]. 
 
Granting premise 3 for the sake of argument, we get the streamlined argument (when I 
refer to premises, I will have the streamlined argument in mind): 
 
1. There is a factual difference between the claim that someone is one or the other of 
the two continuers in fission cases. 
2. There could be a factual difference between the claims that someone is one or the 
other of the two continuers in fission cases only if subject-body dualism were true. 
3. Subject-body dualism is true [1-2]. 
 
The basic idea of the argument is that the materialist can’t make sense of there being a 
factual difference between the claim that someone is one or the other of two continuers in 
fission cases.  The reason is that the materialist has to appeal to bodily or psychological 
continuity or some combination of these to ground claims about transtemporal identity 
(call these empirical criteria of transtemporal identity), but in the fission case there is 
complete symmetry with respect to all the empirical criteria between A and RA, on the one 
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hand, and A and LA, on the other.  Whatever you can say about either case you can say 
equally about the other.  How then can there be a factual difference between the two 
claims? 
In (Ludwig 2013), I argued that on the three most plausible interpretations of 
‘factual difference’ in premise 2, the argument failed.  Consider our initial case, and let ‘D’ 
describe the relevant facts completely except for the facts about identity between A, LA, 
and RA.  Then consider the claims P1-P3. 
 
P1: D and A = LA. 
P2: D and A = RA. 
P3: D and A  LA and A  RA. 
 
We assume that LA  RA.  In terms of this case, the three interpretations of ‘there is a 
factual difference between P1 and P2’ are these: 
 
(1) P1 is true and P2 false or P1 is false and P2 is true. 
(2) P1 and P2 differ in content (express different propositions). 
(3) P1 and P2 both express genuine possibilities. 
 
(1) says that there being a factual difference is there being a fact of the matter which is true 
and which false.  (2) says that the factual difference is a matter of P1 and P2 expressing 
different propositions.  (3) says that it is a matter of their expressing genuine possibilities 
(they might express different propositions but neither express something that is possible).  
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Briefly, I argued in (Ludwig 2013) that (1) cannot be the right interpretation because NR 
allows that P3 is a genuine possibility and she doesn’t argue it is not actual.  I argued that 
(2) isn’t sufficient for the argument because the materialist can make sense of there being a 
difference in content between P1 and P2 by saying that that ‘A = LA/RA’ means ‘LA/RA’s 
body is A’s body’.  Finally, I argued (in part—I return to this below) that (3) isn’t sufficient 
because, even granting that, in a world in which P1 or P2, A would not have empirical 
criteria of transtemporal identity, it would be a modal fallacy to infer we don’t actually have 
empirical criteria of transtemporal identity.  
NR responded in (Nida-Rümelin 2013) that (i) the criticism fails because it 
overlooks the intended interpretation of factual difference (let’s call this the fourth 
interpretation, which I will explain below), and that (ii), in any case, the third 
interpretation is sufficient for the argument to go through, when supplemented with the 
assumption that objects have their transtemporal identity conditions essentially.  I respond 
in this paper.   
In section 2, I take up the fourth interpretation, identify the underlying assumption 
that motivates it (that in first person thought we have a positive conception of the self that 
excludes empirical criteria of transtemporal identity), and formulate an argument for 
subject-body dualism that rests directly on that assumption.  In section 3, I argue that we 
do not have good reason to accept the assumption because relevant features of first person 
thought are accommodated by our referring to ourselves directly and not under any mode 
of presentation (or by description).  In section 4, I respond to the claim that the argument 
on the third interpretation is successful when combined with the assumption that we have 
our criteria for transtemporal identity essentially.  I argue that the third interpretation 
 5 
requires a contradiction be true because it is inconsistent with the necessity of identity, so 
that the only possibilities we could be thinking of are epistemic possibilities.  I explain this 
in terms of the account of first person thought developed in section 3.  Section 5 is a short 
conclusion.    
2. The Fourth Interpretation and the Reformulated Argument  
The fourth interpretation is expressed in the following passage: 
 
[4I] … the fourth (and originally intended) interpretation of the claim that there is a 
factual difference [between] P1 and P2 … can be made explicit in the following way: 
there is an objective feature which would have to be realized in addition to what 
description D states for P1 to be realized, and there is (a different) objective feature 
which would have to be realized in addition to what description D states for P2 to be 
realized.   (Nida-Rümelin 2013, 705) 
 
NR says that (i) “that there is a factual difference between P1 and P2 is compatible with the 
metaphysical impossibility of both P1 and P2,” for (ii) it “does not imply that the fulfillment 
of description D is metaphysically compatible with the relevant feature which would 
render P1 actual” and likewise for P2, and “so it does not imply the metaphysical possibility 
of P1 or the metaphysical possibility of P2” (loc. cit.).2  As the last clause indicates, (ii) is the 
ground for (i). 
                                                      
2 In her (Nida-Rümelin 2010), NR wrote: “This difference appears to be factual in this sense: ‘D and Andrea is 
L-Andrea’ and ‘D and Andrea is R-Andrea’ are not just two legitimate description[s] of one and the same 
course of events.  Rather there is—according to the way we conceive of the situation—an objective possible 
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Would a factual difference in this sense help us to understand why premise 2 of the 
(streamlined) argument should be accepted? 
I do not think that [4I] is sufficient, but I also think that there is more in the 
background than is expressed here, and we will come to this in a moment.  The reason that 
[4I] is not sufficient is that a proponent of empirical criteria of personal identity over time 
could accept it as it stands.  If one thinks that our criteria for personal identity over time 
involve bodily or psychological continuity (or both), then in fission cases, given that LA  
RA, that A is not identical with the pair of LA and RA, and that the symmetry of the case 
precludes choosing one over the other, the only option is to say that A does not survive.  A 
does not survive because survival requires there be a unique closest continuer of A (which 
is close enough—let this be understood).  Where there is no unique closest continuer, A 
does not survive.  (This is what we say about cell fission.)  How can the proponent of an 
empirical criterion of personal identity accept that there is an objective feature which has to 
be realized in addition to what D states for P1 to be realized?  Given that it does not have to 
be a feature which is compatible with D, she can say that the proposition that LA is the best 
continuer of A expresses the relevant objective fact that you would have to add—though it 
turns out to be incompatible with D, which entails that there is no best continuer of A.  
Since it is incompatible with D, it is clearly something in addition to what D expresses that 
                                                                                                                                                                           
feature of the world that makes one of the two descriptions true and the other wrong.  The factual difference 
may be described [by] pointing out that Andrea will have a different future depending on which of the two 
possible identity facts will obtain” (2010, 196).  One might be forgiven for thinking NR was assuming that P1 
and P2 were possible, and that the relevant possible feature of the world, as it would make true one of the 
two descriptions (which here are explicitly P1 and P2), was compatible with D. 
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would have to obtain.  If we were to add that the additional objective features were 
compatible with D, that is P1 and P2 were each possible, then this response would be 
closed off.  But then this would be equivalent to the third proposal after all.  As we will see 
in section 4, however, the third proposal is incoherent.3 
                                                      
3 A referee for this journal suggested that one might say that the additional objective features (call them F1 
and F2 respectively) were each compatible with D and that this was still compatible with P1 and P2 being 
metaphysically impossible.  So the idea is this: that F1 obtains and D is possible, and P1 entails that F1 obtains 
but not vice versa, and that F2 obtains and D is possible and P2 entails that F2 obtains, but not vice versa, and 
that is what the factual difference comes to.   But it is not required that P1 or P2 be possible.   However, this 
divides into two cases.  Either P1 or P2 is possible or neither P1 nor P2 is possible.  The first case collapses 
into proposal three (see note 11).   So we may restrict attention to the viability of the claim that F1 and F2 are 
both compatible with D but P1 and P2 are impossible.   
This is not NR’s intended interpretation.  On the intended interpretation, the factual difference “does 
not imply that the fulfillment of description D is metaphysically compatible with the relevant feature which 
would render P1 actual” and likewise for P2.  Therefore, as noted, on NR’s interpretation of the factual 
difference, it could involve empirical criteria of transtemporal identity, such as being the closest (close 
enough) bodily continuer, since the features don’t have to be compatible with D.    
Still, could NR appeal to this new suggestion instead?  Not without rejecting the reasoning she 
actually engages in.  I noted that (ii) is supposed to be the reason for (i). 
(i) the factual difference is compatible with the impossibility of P1 and P2, 
 (ii) the factual difference “does not imply that the fulfillment of description D is metaphysically 
compatible with the relevant feature which would render P1 actual” and likewise for P2. 
NR states (ii) and then immediately writes: “so it [the factual difference] does not imply the metaphysical 
possibility of P1 or the metaphysical possibility of P2.”  This is why she says that the factual difference is 
compatible with the impossibility of P1 and P2, that is, (i).  More specifically, (ii) is the ground for (i) because 
the idea is that if only F1 could be compatibly added to D that would suffice for A = LA, and similarly for F2 
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and A = RA.   That is why we get to say that F1/F2 are objective features that would be just what has to be 
added to D for P1/P2 to be realized.  But if it is left open that they are not compatible with D, it is left open 
that P1 and P2 are not possible.  If we said instead that D was compatible with F1, then, by hypothesis, the 
relation required for A = LA would be realized in some possible world, and so A = LA is possible.  And if we 
said that D was compatible with F2, then the relation required for A = RA would be realized in some possible 
world and A = RA is possible.   But if either is, surely the other is, given the symmetry of the situation, and so 
we would be back with interpretation 3.  
Why not reject the reasoning?  Couldn’t one just insist that F1 is compatible with D (mutatis mutandis 
for F2) and that P1 and P2 are impossible?  But now why are P1 and P2 impossible?  It is not because of the 
symmetry involving empirical criteria of transtemporal identity, because we are rejecting empirical criteria of 
transtemporal identity.  So if the objective non-empirical feature F1 that would be just what has to be added 
to D to realize P1 is compatible with D, there is a possible world in which D and the objective feature F1 which 
we need to add to D to realize P1 are co-realized.  That is all then that is needed, given what we have said, to 
realize P1.  So P1 is possible.  Otherwise there is no content to the idea that the feature F1 is an objective 
feature that is what is to be added to D to realize P1.  Similarly for F2 and P2.   
What if one said: but why do F1 and F2 have to be sufficient for P1 and P2 (given D)?   Why can’t they 
just be necessary? NR aims to show that transtemporal identity of subjects of experience is not grounded by 
empirical criteria.  Thus, in a case like the fission case except that LA/RA was the only survivor, there would 
be an objective feature, F1+/F2+, that was non-empirical which in the circumstances sufficed for A=LA/A=RA.   
Thus, F1+/F2+ is the feature that would have to be realized in addition to D for P1/P2 to be realized, where it 
is not merely a necessary condition but sufficient, given that D duplicates whatever empirical relations there 
are between A and LA/RA, in the circumstances in which F1+/F2+ are sufficient for A=LA/A=RA.  And now 
we are back to where we started.  So the trouble is this: if we want to acknowledge that P1 and P2 are both 
impossible, but we want to reject empirical criteria of transtemporal identity, we can’t say the non-empirical 
condition that is all that needs to be added to underwrite P1 (mutatis mutandis for P2) is compatible with D. 
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However, [4I] does not fully express the underlying thought.  We need to look at the ground 
for the claim that there is an additional objective feature that would have to be added.  NR 
says that we  
 
[a] … have a clear positive understanding of an objective feature of the world that 
would make it the case that one of the two successors (and not the other) is the 
original person.  [i] If, for instance, P1 is realized, then the original person Andrea 
[my A] is living L-Andrea’s life after the operation.  [ii] Andrea has a completely 
different life after the operation (she has a fundamentally different future when 
considered from her perspective at the earlier moment) if P2 is realized. We have 
the conceptual capacity to positively conceive this difference … .  [b] The basic idea 
can be put quite simply: we understand the difference between P1 and P2 by 
considering it from Andrea’s perspective.  Thinking about Andrea in the first person 
mode we are able to grasp the difference between a world in which she (rigid 
designation of Andrea) will undergo experiences related to the body with the left 
brain hemisphere, and a world in which she will undergo the experiences related to 
the body with the right brain hemisphere.  (703-4; labeling in square brackets 
added) 
 
[b] is more fundamental here than [a].  The conditionals [i] and [ii] would usually be 
treated as presupposing that the antecedents are possible (so that they are not just trivially 
true because of a necessarily false antecedent).  But we are not supposed to assume that P1 
and P2 are possible because D and the objective feature that would make it the case that, 
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e.g., in the case of P1, A = LA was true may not be compatible.  But given this, so far the 
proponent of the empirical criterion of identity can accept [i] and [ii].   
Turn to [b] then.  What is it to think about Andrea in the first person mode?  To 
elucidate this, we should return to the original article (Nida-Rümelin 2010, sec. 4-6).  This 
will reveal that what is crucial is the content of the positive conception of the difference 
between P1 and P2 (at least so far as what it excludes), and we will here identify, I believe, 
the fulcrum of the argument.   
The key idea is brought out by first imagining oneself in A’s position.  You may 
wonder whether you will survive fissioning and whether, if you do, you will be PL (the 
person associated with the left hand body) or PR (the person associated with the right 
hand body).  You wonder whether in the morning, if you wake up, you will see PL’s face in 
the mirror or PR’s face in the mirror, whether you will feel pain if PL’s body is pricked, or if 
PR’s body is pricked, and so on.  You have a clear grasp, it seems, of what it would be to be 
one or the other of PL or PR from the first person point of view, that is, of what facts would 
be appropriate for the one hypothesis or the other from that point of view, where these 
facts can be stated in the form “I will have property P at moment m’.   From this, NR 
concludes that  
 
Claim: 1: Transtemporal self-attributions are conceptually prior to self-
identifications.  (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 203) 
 
The argument is given in the following passage: 
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You understand the assumption ‘I will be the L-person’ on the basis of 
understanding thoughts like ‘I will have property P.’ In other words and more 
precisely: you understand what has to be the case for your utterance of ‘I will be the 
L-person’ to be true on the basis of your understanding of what would render your 
self-attribution ‘I will have property P in the future moment m’ true.  We can 
formulate this claim in a more abstract way: transtemporal self-attributions 
(thoughts that can be expressed by sentences like ‘I will have property P’ or ‘I had 
property P’) are conceptually prior to self-identifications (thoughts that can be 
expressed by sentences of the form ‘I will be P at moment m’ or ‘I was P at moment 
m’).  (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 198) 
 
It is important here also that this be a “clear positive understanding of what would have to 
be the case for [one’s] thought ‘I will be the L-person’ to be true … due to [one’s] clear 
positive understanding of what has to be the case for certain I-thoughts of the form ‘I will 
have property P’ to be true” (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 201, emphasis added). 
NR adds to this a second, important claim, namely, that your “understanding of what 
has to be the case for your I-thought ‘I will have property P’ to be true in no way depends 
on the empirical criteria of transtemporal identity of subjects of experience that you 
implicitly accept” (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 199).  NR argues for this by asking us to consider 
whether one’s understanding of what it would be for one to be in pain in the future, for 
example, would change when one’s explicit conception of the requirements for personal 
identity change.  For example, suppose one confidently expects that one will survive when 
one’s body and brain are destroyed provided that a new brain is created from a scan of the 
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old with the same brain states, preserving psychological continuity.  One thinks, of a 
moment m after the expected destruction of one’s body, ‘I will be in pain at m’.  Then 
suppose one comes to reject the psychological continuity account of person identity.  One 
comes to think now ‘It is false that I will be in pain at m’.  You change your mind about the 
truth of the thought ‘I will be in pain at m’ but “you have not thereby changed your 
understanding of the content of your own I-thought.  Your conceptual grasp of what has to 
be the case for your I-thought to be true has not changed at all” (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 199).  
Only your view of what empirical criteria are necessary and sufficient for your I-thought to 
be true has changed.  NR concludes that our conceptual grasp of what it is for one have a 
certain property at a future time is independent of any empirical criteria for transtemporal 
identity you accept. 
 
Claim 2. Transtemporal self-attribution is conceptually invariant with respect to 
changes in the thinker’s accepted criteria of identity of people across time.  (Nida-
Rümelin 2010, 203) 
 
This contrasts with individuals who are not conscious.  Claims 1 and 2 (NR argues) entail 
claim 3: 
 
Claim 3: Transtemporal self-identification is conceptually invariant with respect to 
changes in a thinker’s accepted criteria of identity of people across time. (Nida-
Rümelin 2010, 203) 
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NR argues that given claims 1-3, it follows that the claims apply also for other-directed 
thought.  If we think another is capable of first person thought, we will think that she will 
conceive of herself as a subject of properties in the future in a way that is conceptually 
fundamental relative to self-identification, and conceptually invariant with respect to views 
about empirical criteria for personal identity.  In thinking about what it would be for 
another person to be one or the other of two people who result from a fission event 
involving her, we will think of it as a matter of what has to be so for her first person 
thought about her having future properties to be true.  NR argues further that this extends 
to subjects of experience who are not capable of first person thoughts, such as infants and 
non-linguistic animals: we ask whether if such a subject could think first person thoughts, 
its first person thought about its future properties would be true, in asking about what 
individual it will be in the future.  This then generates claims 4-6: 
 
Claim 4: Transtemporal attribution of properties to other experiencing subjects is 
conceptually invariant with respect to changes in the thinker’s accepted criteria of 
subject identity across time. 
 
Claim 5: Transtemporal attribution of properties to others is conceptually prior to 
transtemporal identification with respect to others. 
 
Claim 6: The conceptual content of other-directed transtemporal identification is 
invariant with respect to possible changes of the accepted criteria of subject identity 
across time. Transtemporal criteria of subject identity do not enter the conceptual 
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content of other-directed transtemporal identification. (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 204-
205) 
 
The two most important claims here are that in thinking in the first person mode about 
what our future properties are (a) we have a positive understanding of what is involved (b) 
which is independent of our views with respect to change in the thinker’s accepted criteria 
of subject identity across time.  If this is true, then we cannot make use of the rejoinder to 
the fourth proposal considered above, because while it would capture an objective fact that 
would be something in addition to what is expressed by D, it would not be independent of 
empirical criteria for transtemporal identification.  
The emphasis on a positive understanding in (a) is important.  It is this I wish to 
examine.  I grant in thinking of ourselves as having properties in the future in the “first 
person mode” we do not think of ourselves under a conception that presupposes empirical 
criteria of transtemporal identity. But the idea that we have a positive understanding of 
what is involved goes beyond this, and this, as we will see, is required if the argument is to 
go through. 
What does the emphasis on positive understanding in (a) come to and why is it 
important?  P1 and P2 differ only in that in P1 where the predicate ‘= LA’ appears in P2 the 
predicate ‘=RA’ appears.  We might say that the positive understanding of the difference 
involved attaches to these, but (i) this would not give any special weight to the first person 
mode of thought and (ii) if this is all the positive difference comes to the proponent of 
empirical criteria of transtemporal identity could appeal to it as well.  The positive 
understanding that carries the weight must then, I think, attach to the mode of presentation 
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of the self.  Thus, the weight rests on the idea that we think in the first person mode of 
ourselves in a way that positively characterizes the self so as to exclude that the self has 
empirical criteria for transtemporal identity.  It has to exclude that the self has empirical 
criteria of transtemporal identity, because if it leaves it open (if it were “topic neutral,” for 
example), the argument for subject-body dualism collapses.4 
If we add to this that  
 
[MT] if we are identical with, composed in part, or constituted by any material object or 
stuff (or even immaterial stuff), then we have empirical criteria for transtemporal 
identity,  
 
we can infer that we are not identical with, etc., any material object (or immaterial stuff). 
This would secure subject-body dualism.  If we assume that necessarily subjects of 
experience are capable of the relevant sort of non-illusory first person thought, then we can 
conclude that subject-body dualism is necessarily true. 
 
                                                      
4 A referee asked why NR would have to accept that the positive understanding excludes empirical criteria of 
transtemporal identity.  Suppose it doesn’t.  Then whatever factual difference there is between P1 and P2 that 
rests on this positive understanding is compatible with empirical criteria of transtemporal identity, and 
therefore compatible with a materialist view, and therefore compatible with the rejection of subject-body 
dualism.  So the argument for subject-body dualism won’t go through if we leave it open that we have 
empirical criteria for transtemporal identity. 
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In light of this, we can see that the appeal to a factual difference between P1 and P2 is not 
essential for the argument.  It rests on an assumption that will drive the argument 
independently.  We can state the argument as follows: 
 
1. We think (correctly) in the first person mode of ourselves in a way that positively 
characterizes the self so as to exclude that the self has empirical criteria for 
transtemporal identity. 
2. If we are identical with, composed in part, or constituted by any material object or 
stuff (or even immaterial stuff), then we have empirical criteria for transtemporal 
identity.  [MT] 
3. We are not identical with any material object [1-2]. 
 
Call this the fundamental argument. 
3. First person thought 
I agree that the fundamental argument is valid, but reject the first premise.  The first 
premise rests on claim 2.   I reject claim 2, repeated here, on the reading that supports the 
first premise.   
 
Claim 2. Transtemporal self-attribution is conceptually invariant with respect to 
changes in the thinker’s accepted criteria of identity of people across time.  (Nida-
Rümelin 2010, 203) 
 
I accept a weaker claim, however.  The weaker claim is 2*. 
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Claim 2* The content of transtemporal self-attributions is invariant with respect to 
changes in the thinker’s accepted criteria of identity of people across time.   
 
This is distinct from Claim 2, which I take to entail, via the modifier ‘conceptually’, that 
there is a positive way in which we present the self that excludes criteria of identity of 
people over time.   (If we say that claim 2 and 2* are the same, then the objection is that 
premise 1 doesn’t follow.)    
How can claim 2* be true though claim 2 is not?  (Alternatively, how can claim 2* be 
true yet premise 1 not follow?)  The answer is that we could think of ourselves directly, 
without bringing ourselves under any concept, or conception, at all, other than, perhaps, 
that of a thing, and think of ourselves directly as being related to a time in the future of the 
present by having a certain property then.  This would explain why what we are thinking is 
invariant with respect to our criteria for transtemporal identity over time.  To put it in 
other words, we do not pick out the future self as  
 
the x such that x exists at future time t and x bears R to me at the present time,  
 
and attribute a property to whatever is denoted by that, but we think:  
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at some time t in the future of the present, I [thought of directly at the present time] 
have such and such a property at t.5    
 
To take an example,  think about the proposition expressed by the English sentence ‘I will 
have a headache tomorrow morning’, as asserted by me now, taking ‘I’ to introduce into the 
proposition expressed just its referent, i.e., the speaker.  The proposition is a singular 
proposition.  The rule for the use of the pronoun involves a description: 
 
(R) For any x, any time t, any subject u, ‘I’ refers to x at t as uttered by u iff x = u. 
 
But the rule doesn’t enter into the content of the proposition, only what object it assigns as 
the referent of ‘I’.  Take ‘@’ to be a directly referring term that picks out me.6  Then, where 
‘N’ directly refers to the time of utterance (and ‘>’ means ‘is later than’), the proposition is: 
 
                                                      
5 I made this claim in note 3 of the 2013 paper, and related it to the final point I made in that paper.  NR’s 
reply has helped me to see that this is where the most fundamental disagreement between us lies.  
6 The reader will notice that I am not distinguishing de re and de se thoughts.  I give an explanation for the 
substitution puzzles that motivate drawing the distinction in (Ludwig 1996).  My view is that when one uses 
the first person pronoun, given knowledge of the rule, one uses it on the basis of thoughts that are indeed 
directly about the self, but when we use a proper name, even if it has the same referent, there is no guarantee 
that one locates the referent directly in thought.  This is what gives rise to the substitution puzzles. The 
crucial point for the argument in the text is just that we do think of ourselves directly (in thought) when we 
express a thought using the first person pronoun, this is an attitude toward a singular proposition, and this 
expresses what we have in mind by the first person mode of thought. 
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[FH] [t: t > N](@ has a headache at t and t lies within the morning of the tomorrow of N) 
 
That is clearly invariant with respect to @’s views about transtemporal criteria for 
personal identity.  If the content of the thought I have when I express myself using the 
sentence ‘I will have a headache tomorrow morning’ is given by the proposition that this 
sentence expresses, then while claim 2* is true, claim 2 (interpreted as sketched above) is 
not (because as interpreted above, claim 2 says we present ourselves in first person 
thought in some positive manner, as having some features, whereas if the thought about 
the self is direct, the self is not presented as having any features).  Likewise then premise 1, 
repeated here, of the fundamental argument is false.  What is true is premise 1. 
 
1. We think (correctly) in the first person mode of ourselves in a way that positively 
characterizes the self so as to exclude that the self has empirical criteria for 
transtemporal identity. 
1.  We think (correctly) in the first person mode of ourselves in a way that does not 
include that the self has empirical criteria for transtemporal identity. 
 
1 is compatible with our having empirical criteria for transtemporal identity. 
What are the implications for claims 1 and 3, repeated here? 
 
Claim: 1: Transtemporal self-attributions are conceptually prior to self-
identifications.  (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 203) 
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Claim 3: Transtemporal self-identification is conceptually invariant with respect to 
changes in a thinker’s accepted criteria of identify of people across time. (Nida-
Rümelin 2010, 203) 
 
In thinking about oneself as having a property in the future, as in [FH], one thinks of oneself 
directly at the present time, and of oneself so thought of as related by having a headache 
then to a time located in the future of the present time.  This guarantees that the person 
one is thinking of as having a headache at a time subsequent to the present is oneself.  But 
does this show that self-attributions are conceptually prior to self-identifications?   
What does this mean?  The natural reading is that one can self-attribute future 
properties without first identifying some future self as oneself.  If this is what it means, 
then we can accept it, but it does not get us very far, if the present picture is correct.  For on 
that picture, while it is true that when one thinks of oneself as having a property in the 
future, there is no question that arises about identifying oneself as the one that one is 
thinking about, this is just because one is thinking about oneself directly in the present as 
being related to a future time which one picks out by a restricted quantifier anchored by a 
direct reference to the time of the thought.  One has not identified oneself as some future 
individual.  One has only picked oneself out in the way one does when thinking a thought 
about a property one has at the present moment.  One is not called on to think in any 
substantive way about what it would be for one to survive to have a property in the future.  
And self-attributions of future properties in this way leaves it open what would have to be 
true for anything at any future time to be oneself. 
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What about claim 3, though?  This has to be given up if claim 2 is given up because it would, 
like claim 2, presuppose that in thinking about our future selves in the first person way we 
have a positive conception of the self which rules out our having empirical criteria of 
transtemporal identity.   
These remarks carry over to claims 4-6. 
So far, I have only said what follows if we accept this sketch of the content of first 
person thoughts about future properties of the self.  One might object at this point to the 
account of the content of the proposition expressed by ‘I will have a headache tomorrow’ or 
to the claim that the thought I have about properties of my future self expressed with the 
first person pronoun in subject position is properly specified by the proposition expressed 
by the sentence that I use.  I respond to this in two stages.  First, I give an argument to show 
that we do not pick ourselves out via any purely qualitative mode of presentation, so that 
there must be some element of direct reference in thought to the self.  Second, I argue that, 
given this, we have no reason to think we subsume the self under any positive conception 
or concept in referring to ourselves in the “first person mode.” 
The argument for the claim that we do not pick ourselves out via any purely qualitative 
mode of presentation, goes as follows (Ludwig 1996). 
 
1. We know that we are able to think about ourselves and attribute properties to 
ourselves.   
2. If we were able to think of ourselves only by way of a purely qualitative mode of 
presentation (or description), then we would not know that we are able to think 
about ourselves and attribute properties to ourselves. 
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3. Therefore, we do not pick ourselves out only by way of a purely qualitative mode of 
presentation (or description). 
 
The subargument for premise 2 goes as follows. 
 
1. We do not know that the universe does not contain (timelessly speaking) qualitative 
duplicates of everything that exists (or at least of ourselves up to the extent of our 
knowledge).  
2. If the universe contains qualitative duplicates of everything that exists (or at least 
ourselves up to the extent of our knowledge), then no purely qualitative mode of 
presentation (or description) uniquely denotes any individual (or ourselves to the 
extent of our knowledge). 
3. Therefore, if we were able to think of ourselves only by way of a purely qualitative 
mode of presentation (or description), we would not know that we are able to think 
about ourselves and attribute properties to ourselves. 
 
The argument for premise 1 of the subargument is that we do not know that, for example, 
Nietzsche’s hypothesis of eternal recurrence is not true, that is, we do not know that the 
universe does not repeat each temporal segment of it qualitatively identically an infinite 
number of times.7 
                                                      
7 I say ‘for example’, because this is not the only hypothesis we could appeal to here.  Do we know that there 
are not an infinite number of spatio-temporally isolated universes (like David Lewis “possible worlds” but 
without the commitment to explaining modal claims in terms of them) among which there are qualitative 
 23 
 
It might be said in response that physics tells us that Nietzsche’s hypothesis is in fact false.8  
The second law of thermodynamics ensures that the universe will die a heat death in a 
state of maximum entropy.  However, this overstates what we know.  The matter is not 
entirely settled in physics whether the universe iterates through infinite cycles (a Big Bang 
followed by a Big Crunch, followed by a Big Bang and so on).9  But even granting that it is 
settled that cycles were not physically possible—that the universe is open and will die a 
heat death—this doesn’t matter.  The fact is that we do not need to know what physicists 
know (if they know that) in order to know that we are able to refer to ourselves (see note 7 
also).  For most people, it is epistemically open that there are qualitative duplicates of 
them, but this is not a threat to their knowledge that they can refer to themselves. So the 
real force of the argument is that our knowledge that we think about ourselves is not 
hostage to whether there are qualitative duplicates of us, but this could be so only if we 
                                                                                                                                                                           
duplicates of ours?  We could not rule these out by any empirical means, and since it is possible that a 
universe contain an infinite number of spatio-temporally isolated universes one of which is just like ours, 
there is no a priori argument to show that this hypothesis is false.   
8 Eternal recurrence does not follow form the hypothesis of infinite time.  Consider two cylinders with marks 
that line up at time zero, one of which begins rotating once per second and the other 2 times per second.  
They will never line up again in the original configuration, since that would require 2 to be equal to the ratio 
of two integers.  This is a variant of a counterexample provided by Georg Simmel in 1907 and reported in 
(Kaufmann 1974, 327).  What is at issue is not the necessity but the epistemic possibility of eternal 
recurrence. 
9 See (Penrose 2010). 
 24 
could think about ourselves directly and not only as the unique possessors of some set of 
(purely qualitative) properties. 
This leaves it open that we think of ourselves by a mode of presentation that 
functions like a complex demonstrative.  Let ‘subject’ express the special conception of the 
type of being that represents a positive conception of the self that excludes empirical 
criteria of transtemporal identity.  Then it is open still that we think about ourselves in a 
thought of the form ‘that subject is in pain’.  We can think of ‘that subject’ as a restricted 
quantifier of the form ‘the x: x is that and x is a subject’ as suggested in (Lepore 2000), or as 
we could think of the function of ‘subject’ as a filter on how the demonstrative element 
refers, as Kaplan suggested (Kaplan 1989, 515).  In either case, we refer directly to the self, 
but at the same time in doing so bring the self under the concept of a subject.  The second of 
these components, though, does not play a crucial role in the mechanism of reference itself.   
My argument against first person thought involving this extra component has three 
parts.  First, (a) it is gratuitous and (b) we should not adopt views that are gratuitous.  It is 
gratuitous because the main diagnostic for there being a positive conception of the self is 
that in self-attributing future thoughts we think of the self in a way that is invariant with 
respect to changes in our conception of empirical criteria for transtemporal identity.  But 
once we see that we refer to the self directly, we have an explanation for this that does not 
require that we bring the self under any positive conception.  Second, we could respond to 
the charge that it is gratuitous if there were present in reflection on self-attributions of 
properties some positive conception of the self that did exclude empirical criteria of 
transtemporal identity.  But we do not, in fact, bring ourselves under such a positive 
conception of the self in self-attributing properties.  Or, to speak more cautiously, I do not 
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find, that when I rap my knuckles on my desk, and have the thought that I am in pain, I am 
in thinking I qua subject am in pain, where the concept of a subject is a positive conception 
of what I am thinking about.  It is implied by my thinking about myself at all that I am a 
thinking thing, but this does not enter into the content of the thought itself, apart from its 
“predicate”.  Even if it did, it would not be the right sort of conception to support the 
exclusion of empirical criteria for transtemporal identity.  Third, if we did bring the self 
under a positive concept that excluded empirical criteria of transtemporal identity, then we 
should be able to articulate what about it precludes our having them.  What is it though?  Is 
it that we are composed of immaterial stuff rather than material stuff?  This won’t work 
because the same argument applies here, as NR notes.  If we were some immaterial stuff, 
there would be criteria for transtemporal identity appropriate for it, but it is clear that the 
content of self-attributions of future properties would be invariant with respect to our 
conceptions of what that involved.  Only thinking of the self as a thing that is utterly simple, 
and whose persistence through time is not governed by informative criteria at all, would 
seem to have the right character.  This would not rule out (a priori) its being a material 
thing that was simple, however.  And it is hardly clear that when we think about ourselves 
we are thinking about something that is utterly simple.10  This seems to be an open 
question relative to our thinking of ourselves in the first person mode, in the way we 
express when we use the first person pronoun.   
 
                                                      
10 This point is connected with the remark in note 10 in (Ludwig 2013) that the original argument applies 
only to material objects that are subject to fissioning.  Absolutely simple objects are not capable of fissioning.   
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Finally, even if we did invariably bring the self under such a concept, given that it is not 
required for us to refer to ourselves in thought in the first person mode, it would remain an 
open question whether we were correct to bring ourselves under such a concept, and this 
would not require that we think in general that we mistakenly attribute thoughts to 
ourselves, for the illusion would extend only to what is from the point of view of our 
ordinary attributions an extraneous and unnecessary addendum to first person thoughts. 
To summarize: in first person thought we think about ourselves directly at the 
present time.  This is true also when we attribute to ourselves properties in the future, 
because we are thinking of ourselves as picked out now directly as being related to times in 
the future (of the time of the thought) by way of having various properties then.  Thus, the 
content of those thoughts are invariant with respect to variations in our conceptions of 
criteria for transtemporal identity of people.  This does not require that we have a positive 
concept of the self that excludes empirical criteria for transtemporal identity.  The 
suggestion that we do bring the self under such a concept is not supported by reflection on 
first person thought, and in the absence of that it is gratuitous to suggest that we bring the 
self under such a concept. Finally, even if we did, it would not show that we did not have 
empirical criteria for transtemporal identity and whatever illusion this involved would be 
localized and not undermine the vast majority of what we think about ourselves.  The 
fundamental argument fails. 
4. Possibilities and the Third Interpretation 
I turn now to the question whether the third interpretation of the factual difference 
between P1 and P2 supports subject-body dualism.  For convenience, I repeat P1-P3 here. 
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P1: D and A = LA. 
P2: D and A = RA. 
P3: D and A  LA and A  RA. 
 
The third interpretation was that P1 and P2 are both genuine possibilities.  On this 
interpretation, the second premise of the streamlined master argument can be 
reformulated as in 2 . 
 
2.  P1 and P2 could be genuine possibilities only if subject-body dualism were true. 
 
In (Ludwig 2013), I argued (in part) that: for the possibility that P1 or the possibility that 
P2 to show that as a matter of fact A did not have empirical transtemporal identity 
conditions, it would have to be necessary that in every possible world either A = LA or A = 
RA;  but this is incompatible with the assumption that it is possible that A  RA and A  LA, 
and if that last were true at the actual world, it would be compatible with our having 
empirical criteria of transtemporal identity in the actual world.  
NR responds by introducing the assumption that we have our transtemporal criteria 
for identity essentially.  If there is a possible world in which A = LA (when RA is also 
produced from A by a fission event), in that world A does not have empirical transtemporal 
identity conditions.  If persons have their transtemporal identity conditions essentially, it 
follows that in the actual world A does not have empirical transtemporal identity 
conditions.   
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Even granting the assumption, there is a problem with the third interpretation.  I 
introduced this problem in the (2013) paper as a response to the first objection.  That 
relied on the charge that P3 was supposed to be possible.  But if it is, then, given the 
necessity of identity, P3 rules out P1 and P2.  I replied that the rejoinder was too powerful, 
because it also means that P1 and P2 cannot both be possibilities.  It would have been more 
straightforward, perhaps, to say that the basic problem with the third interpretation is 
simply that it is incoherent to maintain that P1, P2, and P3 are all possibilities.  Suppose 
that P1 is possible.  Then, given the necessity of identity, (NI), 
 
(NI) For any x, y, if x = y, then for any possible world w, if x exists in w or y exists in 
w, then x = y in w 
 
if it is possible that A = RA, then in any world in which A or RA exist, A = RA, and since RA  
LA, it follows that it is not possible that A = LA.  And if it is possible that A = LA, then it 
follows that it is not possible that A = RA.  And if it is possible that A  RA and A  LA, then it 
follows that it is not possible that A = RA and it is not possible that A = LA.  We cannot hold 
that each of P1, P2 and P3 are genuine possibilities.  Only one of them can be.  Thus, the 
third interpretation of the factual difference in fact involves a claim that is false, namely, 
that P1 and P2 are both genuine possibilities.11 
                                                      
11 It might be suggested that NR needs only one of the two possibilities, not both.  So she might say: P1 is 
possible but not P2 or P2 is possible but not P1.  But this is not the argument that NR is advancing, and, it 
seems, for good reason.  For the problem with this that whatever might ground the claim that P1/P2 is 
possible would seem to ground the claim that the other is possible, given the symmetry of the setup.  In 
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P1, P2 and P3 strike us as prima facie possibilities, but they cannot all be genuine 
conceptual or metaphysical possibilities.  In what sense are they possibilities?  The answer, 
I think, and this will now connect the discussion of this interpretation with the discussion 
in the previous section, is that P1, P2 and P3 are epistemic, not metaphysical or conceptual 
possibilities.  They are epistemic possibilities because when we think of ourselves in the 
first person mode we do so directly, without thereby revealing what our natures are.   
We can imagine what it would be like to be one or the other of the two successors in 
a fission scenario by self-attributing future experiences appropriate for being the one or 
the other.  We might, for example, be told that the right successor will prick the finger of 
her right hand while the left will prick the finger of her left hand.  We can think of what it 
would be like to be in the position of the one, feeling the right finger pricked, rather than 
the left, or vice versa.  In thinking of this, in the first person mode, imagining that one is 
feeling the prick tomorrow there, one thinks a thought that does not involve any 
incoherence.  It is presented as an epistemic possibility at least relative to the content of 
the thought.  This is not directly to think of ourselves as PR or PL.  But it is a short step.  For 
what seems compatible with D is that we are having experiences of a sort which only PR or 
which only PL would be having.  Thus, it will seem open (relative to the content of the 
thought) that we are PR or PL, respectively.  And when we think of others faced with 
fissioning, we can imaginatively project ourselves into their shoes and see that they can 
conceive the same thing from their point of view.  It is epistemically open for them as well, 
relative to the content of their future directed thoughts, that they are the one or the other.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
addition, it amounts to the rejection of P3, which is the position of the materialist, and so without further 
argument it would be question begging.  
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However, (a) these cannot be more than epistemic possibilities because they cannot 
both be metaphysical or conceptual possibilities given (NI), and (b) we have an explanation 
of why they are epistemic possibilities for us that does not require that they be genuine 
metaphysical or conceptual possibilities.  For in thinking or imagining ourselves as feeling 
such and such a prick there, we have a thought of the form (I), where I use ‘I’ to represent 
the unmediated thinking of the subject of the thought by its subject.  The nature of the 
object of thought is not presented in the thought.  Consequently it appears open to us that it 
be true when all the conditions specified by the fissioning scenario are in place.  But what 
we are picking out may be a material object even if not so presented.  Consequently what 
we are thinking, coherently so far as the content of the thought goes, may not be a 
genuinely possibility, because as a matter of fact we have empirical conditions for 
transtemporal identity. 
Our epistemic position with respect to our natures in first person thought is 
analogous to our position with respect to the natures of stuffs for which we introduce 
natural kind terms.  We attach natural kind terms to natural kinds through application to 
examples we pick out by how they present themselves to us.  But the kind properties that 
we aim to keep track of are not given by the features by which we pick them out.  So the 
thoughts we entertain about them (prior to discovering what the kind property is) do not 
reveal their natures to us.  So too in thinking of ourselves in the first person mode, how we 
pick out ourselves does not reveal what we are, and so it is epistemically open what sort of 
thing we are.  The difference is that we are not picking ourselves out by any features we 
have, so that the self is not presented to us in the first person mode of thought in any 
positive way whatsoever.  All of that lies in what we predicate of the self.  
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To summarize, NR is right that requiring that we have our transtemporal identity 
conditions essentially together with the assumption that, for instance, P1 is possible, 
entails that we are not material things or constituted from material things.  But even 
granting the premise, this doesn’t rescue the argument on the third interpretation of 
factual difference.  For the third interpretation asserts that P1 and P2 (and in fact P3) are all 
genuine possibilities.  But this is impossible given (NI).  P1, P2 and P3 are rather epistemic 
possibilities.  That they are epistemic possibilities is explained by the fact that in first 
person mode future attributions of properties we pick out ourselves directly, and so in a 
way that does not present itself as in conflict with our being one or the other of the 
successors in a fission case because it is silent on what our natures are and so on whether 
we have empirical criteria of transtemporal identity.  
5. Summary and Conclusion 
I have argued that the fourth interpretation that NR offers of “factual difference” in her 
(2010) argument for subject-body dualism does not secure an interpretation on which the 
argument goes through, but that a more fundamental claim motivates this way of putting 
the factual difference that carries the argument by itself, namely, that first person thought 
involves a positive conception of the self that excludes our having empirical criteria of 
cross-temporal identity.  In response, I argued that in first person thought, we think of 
ourselves directly.  We do not present ourselves under a special concept that rules out our 
having transtemporal identity conditions.  Thus, the crucial premise in the underlying 
argument is mistaken.  I argued further that the third interpretation, that P1 and P2 are 
both genuine possibilities, is incompatible with the necessity of identity.  They are instead 
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epistemic possibilities that are explained by our primary reference to ourselves being 
direct in a way that does not reveal what sort of thing we are.  
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